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Abstract
Russia Shrinking. An Analysis of Russia’s Population Decline: Causes, Effects and
Solutions.
Michael C. Sullivan, MS 
University o f Nebraska, 2005 
Advisor: Dr. Wally Bacon
The author argues that population decline is the most important challenge to the 
Russian Federation in the twenty-first century. First explored are the causes o f the 
decline, including losses incurred during World War II and Stalin’s bloody purges 
o f the 1930s. Massive health problems are reviewed and offered as leading causes 
of the loss o f population. Diseases such as alcoholism, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS 
are noted at the top of the list. The writer points a finger at the health system as a 
whole, indicating that its status is of a third world country. Second, the writer 
examines what effects the decline has had on Russia as a whole. Most notable is the 
lack o f an active population that can fill the labor needs o f Russia. The writer 
contends that if the Russian economy is to continue to grow it must find a way to 
replace workers as the population grows older. In regards to national security, 
testimony from the Russian military is that there are not enough able bodied 
soldiers to fill the ranks. Third, increased immigration is offered as the only viable 
short term solution to Russia’s population decline.
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1Introduction
The population crisis in the Russian Federation is quickly approaching
c
critical mass. Russia is facing a challenge that, left unchecked, will ultimately spell 
its demise as a viable nation state in the twenty-first century. Due to massive 
health/social issues and emigration, Russia is dying. The current population stands 
at approximately 147 million with roughly half considered to be a part of the 
legitimate workforce. The majority of projections, from Russia and the West, 
predict the population will decline to around 100 million by the year 2050 (U.S. 
Census). Coupled with the challenges listed above, the astounding death to birth 
ratio only adds to the premise that, figuratively and literally, Russia is dying.
My intent in this research is to explore the reasons for Russia’s population 
decline, the consequences of the decline, and the best available solution to arrest 
the slide. The research questions in this paper are threefold. Specifically I ask: 
What are the causes of Russia’s population decline? What are the effects of 
Russia’s population decline? What is the best available solution to Russia’s 
population decline? It is my contention that population decline is the most 
important challenge that the struggling, “managed democracy” of Russia faces in 
contemporary times. If  there is no population to support a nation state, what 
relevance are other issues? Everything else is peripheral. Russia must confront its 
population crisis or risk remaining permanently behind the west. Increased 
immigration is the only logical remedy.
The causes of Russia’s population decline could fill volumes. In the following
2pages I first argue that the current population problem has its roots in World War II 
and the purges of the 1930s. These two events deprived Russia o f tens o f millions 
of able bodied men, most in their reproductive years. While Americans came home 
from the war and started the baby boom, Russians simply did not come home. 
America surged ahead in population as a result.
I also address the problem of disease in Russia, and o f course, alcoholism is a 
logical starting point. The time honored favorite drink, vodka, is consumed to the 
tune of 4 billion bottles a year in Russia, or 40 bottles per resident. Those are 
figures for vodka only, nothing else. Certainly if one were to add other spirits, the 
alcohol consumption statistics would skyrocket. One seventh of the population, or 
around 20 million people, are estimated to be alcoholics (Javeline).
Tuberculosis, or TB, is another massive health challenge. Some estimates put 
the number of cases in Russia as high as two million. The problem is only 
escalating. In 1985 7.7 o f every 100 TB victims died. The death rate now is over 25 
per 100. In 2004 83.1 cases per 100,000 residents were diagnosed. The Red Cross 
says that 130,000 new cases are diagnosed every year (Feshback).
HIV/AIDS has also hit Russia hard in the last two decades. It is estimated that 
one out o f every one hundred people is infected. I provide regional statistics that 
show Russia is responsible for 75% of all HIV/AIDS cases within that FSU region. 
This represents 206,002 more cases than the nearest country in that region (Russian 
Politics & Law).
Declining fertility is also shown as cause for de-population. I show that the
3births per woman in 1987 were 2.19 and dropped to 1.17 in 1999 (Eberstadt). That 
figure has come up marginally but still not close to that needed for natural 
population replacement. Additionally, an overview of the health system is offered 
and the startling statistics for life expectancy are graphically shown.
The effects of the population loss can be seen in two main areas. First, there 
are simply not enough people who are economically active. In the past couple of 
decades the number of people over the age of 60, and thus not working, has 
doubled (Rand). This number will continue to grow and within the next twenty 
years 50% of the population will be over the age of 60. I provide data in the 
following pages that indicates very few people in Russia over the age of 60 are 
economically active. Economic productivity is being lowered every year as a result 
(ILO).
The second effect can be seen in the military. There is not enough of the young 
demographic that is needed to fill the ranks. Dmitry Trenin o f the Carnegie 
Moscow Center says that the composition of the army is absurd (MCC). The 
distorted proportion of officers to enlisted men is one example he lists. Moreover, 
the recruits are of a low quality. Since the fall of the Soviet Union problems have 
abounded. Twenty-five percent o f draftees have only eight years o f education and 
many others have drug problems and arrest records. Russia has been forced to 
lower the induction standards, but the quality o f recruits must be enhanced to field 
an effective army.
Finally, I argue that increased immigration is the only viable short term
4solution to Russia’s population decline. I stipulate that the country must reverse its 
natural replacement trend; however, this can only be a long term solution. The 
population in Russia is decreasing and ageing so rapidly, that a quick fix must be 
implemented. A major psychological obstacle, suspicion of foreigners, must be 
tempered for long term viability.
5Chapter I
The Causes 
World War I, EE & the 1930s Purges
In addition to the current causes o f Russia’s population crisis-disease, 
alcoholism etc.- it is important to look back at the population losses o f the twentieth 
century, most notably World War Two and Stalin’s bloody purges of the 1930s.
However, one can see that a mass destruction of the Russian population 
actually began with World War I. This conflict, following a humiliating defeat at 
the hands of Japan in 1904-05, was a disaster for the country. Several million 
soldiers were lost in this conflict. Notwithstanding the Red Terror o f Lenin in the 
early 1920s, Stalin’s regime was responsible for the loss of tens o f millions o f the 
population during the 1930s and as a result o f World War II, known in Russia as 
“The Great Patriotic War.”
“The estimates for the destruction of the Russian and other non-Russian 
peoples during the period of Stalin’s various five-year plans for modernization, 
Stalin’s war against the intelligentsia and the kulaks, plus the catastrophic losses 
that occurred during World War II, vary between 30-40 million people,” writes 
Seymour W. Itzkoff (Journal o f Social, Political & Economic Studies). The 
estimates for the losses vary from source to source though most agree with 
Itzkofifs’. The effects of losing millions of able bodied men during this period, in 
their reproductive years, would haunt Russia for decades to come. Also 
catastrophic, during Stalin’s purges, was the elimination o f hundreds o f thousands
6of highly educated “intellectuals.” This further hampered Russia’s ability to 
produce the scientists necessary to deal with the health problems o f the twentieth 
century, a legacy that lives on today. “The immigration of hundreds of thousands of 
highly educated Jews to Israel following the collapse of communism,” adds ItzkofF, 
“was a further loss.” (JSPE)
While Stalin’s purges were responsible for many deaths, World War Two 
was most likely responsible for the majority of population loss in the 1930s and 
1940s. J.T. Dykman, of The Eisenhower Institute, sums up the almost 
inconceivable losses of World War II. To Stalin it was a war of attrition:
The populations of the United States and the USSR were about the same, 
130,000,000, when both nations went to war within six months o f each 
other in 1941. To Americans, we were sending our boys to fight a foreign 
war that we'd never experience. To the Soviets, it was an up front and 
personal war of monumental savagery. America would lose slightly more 
than 400,000 soldiers (killed or missing) and almost no civilians during 
World War II and the USSR, depending on which historian you believe, 
would lose at least 11,000,000 soldiers (killed and missing) as well as 
somewhere between 7,000,000 and 20,000,000 million of its civilian 
population during the Great Patriotic War (Eisenhower).
Robert Conquest, author of The Great Terror, describes the results of 
Stalin's purges in the 1930s. Conquest is widely considered to be one of the leading 
authorities on population loss due to the purges of the 1930s:
Many women died as a result o f the war and the purges. But in both cases 
the great bulk o f the victims was certainly male. From neither cause 
should there be much distinction in the figures for the sexes for the under-
730 age groups in 1959. Nor is there. For the 30-34 block there is a 
comparatively small difference, presumably indicating the losses of the 
young Army men in their late teens during the war. In the 35-39 group, 
which could have been expected to take the major war losses, we find 
figures o f 391 to 609 women. One would have thought that these men, in 
their early twenties in the war, would have had the highest losses. But the 
proportion then gets worse still, and for the 40-44, 45-49 and 50-54 
[cohorts] remains a set 384 to 616. Even more striking, the worst 
proportion of all comes for the 55-59 age group (334 to 666: in fact in this 
group alone there are almost exactly twice as many women as men). The 
figures for the 60-69 group (349 to 691) and for the 70 and over group 
(319 to 681) are also much worse than the soldiers' groups. Now all 
authorities agree that the Purge struck in the main at people "between 
thirty and fifty-five", "generally, arrested people are all thirty or over. 
That's the dangerous age: you can remember things." There were few 
young or old, most of them being "in the prime of life." Add twenty years 
for the 1959 position. Precise deductions are not possible. Older men died 
as soldiers in the war. But on the other hand, the mass dispatch to labour 
camps of prisoners of war returned from Nazi hands in 1945 must have led 
to an extra, and non-military, death rate among the younger males. So 
must the guerrilla fighting in the Baltic States and the Western Ukraine, 
which lasted for years after the war, and so must the deportations from the 
Caucasus and the general renewal of Purge activities in the post-war 
period. But in any case, the general effect of the figures is clear enough. 
The wastage of millions of males in the older age groups is too great to be 
masked, whatever saving assumptions we may make. We here have, 
frozen into the census figures, a striking indication of the magnitude of the 
losses inflicted in the Purge {Conquest).
Conquest is certainly correct that precise deductions are not possible. Many
8factors contribute to the legitimacy o f numbers offered up for losses in the war, as 
well as from the purges. First of all, it is important to remember that Russia was 
part o f the Soviet Union. Although it is difficult to determine exact figures for the 
ethnic Russian population versus the overall population of the Soviet Union at that 
time, the table below, showing the figures from 1989, can lend some perspective. 
Only imprecise deductions can be made. Additionally, the secrecy of the Stalin 
regime leads one to be pessimistic in regards to figures released, even after 
Glasnost.
Table 1
Population of the Soviet Union by Region and by Ethnicity, 1989
Soviet Union Russia Not Russia
Population in Millions 285.7 147.0 138.7
Ethnic Russians 145.1 119.8 25.3
Ethnic non-Russians 140.7 27.2 113.4
Source: Anderson
An important part of the analysis is the result of the 1937 census. During the 
Seventeenth Party CPSU Congress of 1934, Stalin had stated that the population was 
168 million. The census put the figure at 162 million and cost the census takers their 
lives. The first figure they had arrived at was actually 156 million, a number they 
realized was too low. They had excluded certain demographics such as the military, 
the NKVD, and prisoners. Famine and flight from the Soviet Union further
9compounded the problem. This exemplifies the problems in determining precise 
numbers (Getty). S. G. Wheatcroft, another widely known expert on this subject, 
wrote the following in a 1990 issue of the journal Soviet Studies:
The demographer Mark Tolts revealed in late 1987 that results of the 1937 
census had indicated a population of 162 million. This flatly contradicted 
the claims o f Rosefielde and Yuri Antonov-Ovseenko that the 1937 census 
had indicated that the population in the USSR was only 156 million and 
that an additional 6 million deaths needed to be added to estimates of 
excess mortality. Subsequently Vsevolod Vasilievich Tsaplin, the Director 
of the Central State Archive of the National Economy o f the USSR 
(TsGANKh SSSR), has revealed more information about the 1937 census, 
intercensal population movements and contemporary evaluations of them. 
Tsaplin reported that the NKVD contingent listed in the 1937 census was 
2,653,036, that 5.7 million deaths were recorded in the famine year of 
1933 instead of the average number of 2.6 million per year for 1927-31, 
and that Kurman, the Deputy head of the Department of Population and 
Health Statistics in the Central Statistical Department (TsUNKhU1), had 
sent a formal statement (‘dokladnaya zapiska’) to Kraval, the Director of 
TsUNKhU, on 14 March 1937 arguing, amongst other things, that the 
mortality recorded in 1933 underestimated reality by 1 million. The 
content and importance of Tsaplin’s article is covered in more detail in 
Alec Nove’s article in this issue of Soviet Studies (Wheatcroft).
Indeed, Nove does explain this in more detail in the same issue, attempting 
to make some sense of the numbers. Addressing Tsaplin’s article he says:
1 The Statistical Office.
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He begins by deploring the fact that many key documents and archives 
remain closed, and that this has led to the appearance in the Soviet press of 
extremely high estimates of the number o f victims, estimates based on 
memoirs, doubtful sources and even inventions. He had access, in his 
official capacity, to documents held by TsUNKhU and Gosplan. These 
give a number of particulars relating to the census of 1937, which, as is 
known, was suppressed, and its authors shot. He cites a letter to Stalin and 
Molotov in March 1937 by I. Kraval, the head of TsUNKhU: the 
population on January 6 1937 came to 162,003,225, or 156.9 million Tess 
military servicemen.’ But the same source gives the number of servicemen 
at that date as 2 million, including camp guards. This leaves a gap of just 
over 3 million (Nove 1).
Nove goes on to note that the population between 1926 and 1937 had grown by 
15 million. It was expected, however, to grow by 21.3 million, according to the 
birth and death records o f that period. This gap was addressed by a man named 
Kurman, who was the deputy head of the Department of Demography and Health. 
Kurman said that the gap was explained by 2 million Kazakhs, Turkmen, and 
Tadzhiks leaving the USSR between 1930 and 1933. Additionally, he reported that 
the 1926 census had included some double-counting. The bulk of the gap, he said, 
was due to “under-recording of deaths in the previous decade.”
At the end of 1990 Nove wrote a follow up article in the same journal 
incorporating newly discovered data and scholarship. He concludes with the 
following:
If upwards o f 7 million were famine and famine-related deaths, and if the 
total (to the nearest round number) was of the order of 10 million, this
11
would imply almost 3 million other deaths: in deportation, detention, and 
shooting. Does this seem plausible? As was noted also by Wheatcroft, the 
Gulag statistics cited in Argumenty i fakty  showed a high death rate in the 
war years (the highest figure, 248,777, was for 1942, the average number 
of Gulag inmates in that year being 1,067,000). For pre-war years the 
reported death rate was very much lower, e.g. Only 4% in 1939. It is o f 
course possible that some of the considerable numbers which appear in 
these statistics as having been 'transferred to other places o f detention’ and 
released’ were never seen again. Tsaplin, in his article, specifically 
referred to the possibility of a further '1.3 million unregistered deaths in 
places o f detention’. So the total could be above 10 million, say 11 million. 
This is well above the estimates o f some o f the so-called revisionists’, and 
well below those of Conquest and Antonov-Ovseenko. I again emphasise 
that this relates only to the period ending in January 1939.
A word about total war losses. The figure o f 26-27 million is now 
frequently cited, e.g. by Volkogonov. Some suspect that it is too high, 
indeed made too high to hide the real scale of the deaths in the 1930s. 
Without wishing to enter into this argument, let me put forward an 
interpretation. It arises from a phrase used by the historian Polyakov: “nas 
stalo na 26-27 millionov men’sh e ” The population at the outbreak of war 
may be calculated by adding to the result of the 1939 census the 
population o f acquired territories and the natural increase in 1939-1941. If  
the total were 193 million, this in turn implies a population at the end of 
1945 of 166-167 million. Maksudov’s view is that, even after allowing for 
the overstatement o f the 1939 population in the census o f that year, 193 
million is on the low side. Argumenty i fakty cites the work of I. 
Kurganov, who estimates the population in 1941 at 197 million, the 1946 
total as 168.5 million. There are as yet no official Soviet figures for the 
years 1945-1949, but published data enable one to get back as far as 1950, 
and these would be consistent with an end-1945 total of 167-168 million.
12
Kurganov's estimate of losses comes to 44 million, but this high figure 
includes the natural increase which would have occurred had there been 
no war. This he estimates at 15.4 million. Subtracting these purely 
hypothetical unborn souls, Kurganov's figure becomes 28.6 million, still 
somewhat higher than Polyakov's 26-27 million. These include not only 
war losses o f every category and from all causes, military and civilian, but 
also emigration, both forced and voluntary, and also the natural decrease,
i.e. the excess of'norm al' deaths over the low wartime number of births 
{Nove 2).
The numbers shown in the previous pages, of course, are highly subjective 
and certainly open to interpretation. As with many issues in Stalin’s regime, many 
official statistics were kept in secret or never recorded. Table 2, from the Russian 
Federation archives, shows the statistics for the period of 1921-1952, minus war 
losses.
13
Table 2
YEAR SHOT CAMPS/PRISON EXILED OTHER
1921 9701 21724 1817 2587
1922 1962 2656 166 1219
1923 414 2336 2044 0
1924 2550 4151 5724 0
1925 2433 6851 6274 437
1926 990 7547 8571 696
1927 2363 12667 11235 171
1928 869 16211 15640 1037
1929 2109 25853 24517 3741
1930 20201 114443 58816 14609
1931 10651 105683 63269 1093
1932 2728 73946 36017 29228
1933 2154 138903 54262 44345
1934 2056 59451 5994 11498
1935 1229 185846 33601 46400
1936 1118 219418 23719 30415
1937 353074 429311 1366 6914
1938 328618 205509 16842 3289
1939 2552 54666 3783 2888
1940 1649 65727 2142 2288
1941 8001 65000 1200 1210
1942 23278 88809 7070 5249
1943 3579 68887 4787 1188
1944 3029 70610 649 821
1945 4252 116681 1647 668
1946 2896 117943 1498 957
1947 1105 76581 666 458
1948 0 72552 419 298
1949 0 64509 10316 300
1950 475 54466 5225 475
1951 1609 49142 3425 599
1952 1612 25824 773 591
TOTAL 799257 2623903 413474 215669
Source: State Archive ofthe Russian Federation, fond 9401, op. 1, delo 4157,11. 201-203, 205.
The table, o f course, does not show the losses of World War Two, famine 
and those killed never reported. Additionally, based on the conduct o f Stalin’s
14
regime, it is logical to assume that a great portion of the millions sent to the gulags 
did not survive. The data, and researchers’ opinions, support the conclusion that, at 
a minimum, the Soviet Union lost 25 million people during Stalin’s rule.
The seeds o f Russia’s current population problems were sown during the 
period o f Stalin’s purges and World War Two. However, the decline of the Russian 
population today is not just due to the past, of course. Adding immensely to the 
problem is Russia’s poor health care system. The social and political challenges the 
country faces have given rise to diseases, such as alcoholism and Tuberculosis. 
These diseases not only put a tremendous strain on the health care system, but also 
threaten to accelerate the population’s downward spiral.
Alcohol
According to Debra Javeline o f the Kennan Institute at the Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars, Russians drink 4 billion bottles of vodka 
a year. This averages out to nearly forty bottles per adult, per year. It is estimated 
that 20 million Russians, or roughly one-seventh of the population, are alcoholics 
(Javeline). The social crisis that has arisen is not a new one; Russians, for centuries, 
have loved the hard stuff. The twenty-first century will not be different.
Nicholas Eberstadt, is the Henry Wendt Scholar in Political Economy at the 
American Enterprise Institute and a member of the Publication Committee of The 
Public Interest. “Russians have always demonstrated a predilection to drink heavy 
spirits in astonishing excess—a fact remarked upon by visiting foreigners for
15
centuries,” reports Eberstadt. “Russia's thirst for hard liquor seems to have reached 
dizzying new heights in the late Soviet era, and then again in the early post- 
Communist era ”(Eberstadt) Additionally, there is a strong correlation between 
alcohol consumption and mortality. This is more striking when looking just at the 
men. When the alcohol consumption rate goes up, so does mortality. The reverse is 
true as well. Large quantities being consumed in one sitting appear to be a major 
cause in risking life ending injury and long term use is causing death through heart 
failure {Eberstadt). An editorial in the St. Petersburg Times explains the statistics 
and points an accusing finger at Moscow:
It is especially frustrating to watch as government agencies address 
serious problems with proposals that are almost laughably inadequate.
The latest case in point came on Tuesday, when Deputy Health Minister 
Gennady Onishchenko launched an assault on the beer industry, claiming 
that beer had become a major contributing factor to Russia's overall 
alcoholism crisis.
Obviously, it is ridiculous that Russian law treats beer as a non­
alcoholic beverage and it is clear that this absurdity plays a role in 
introducing children to drink. This lapse can, and should, be immediately 
remedied, and Russia's responsible beer producers should be the first to 
advocate this step.
However, the Health Ministry must realize that Russia's alcoholism 
problem is far more serious than this. In fact, the bare statistics make a 
strong case that alcoholism is the most serious problem Russia faces.
Half of all Russian men who die, says one study, are drunk. Thirty 
thousand Russians each year die of alcohol poisoning. Alcohol plays a
16
major role in road accidents, homicides, suicides, domestic violence, 
industrial accidents, birth defects, violent crime and so on. Orphanages are 
full o f children abandoned by their alcoholic parents.
Alcoholism is a major contributor to the country's demographic crisis, 
the claims of nationalists about an anti-Russian genocidal conspiracy 
notwithstanding. In fact, even though former Soviet leader Mikhail 
Gorbachev's anti-alcohol campaign was roundly trashed as a failure, 
demographic data show clearly that the number of deaths owing to non­
natural causes fell considerably from 1986 to 1988, before once again 
beginning to rise. Since 1991, accidental death in Russia has increased by 
83 percent, according to the British Medical Journal.
A big part of the problem lies in the fact that the state is as addicted to 
drink as the people are. Last year, vodka duties accounted for $470 million 
in state revenues. Last May, the government set up a state-controlled 
holding company made up of 70 distilleries in an effort to squeeze even 
more revenue from this sector. Obviously, it will be hard for the Health 
Ministry to combat the alcohol problem when other state agencies are 
committed to increasing production and sales.
All o f which means that the government is unlikely to do what 
desperately needs to be done: an effective, all-out campaign - on television 
and radio, on street billboards, in schools, in the press - to persuade people 
to reduce their alcohol consumption. Health officials directing the 
occasional broadside at the beer industry will do nothing (SP times).
Tuberculosis
This disease has become one of the most frightening challenges to Russia’s 
health crisis. Estimates put the number of tuberculosis cases in Russia at two 
million. Murray Feshbach, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(Feshbach), says that this horrible disease is most prevalent among those persons
17
weakened by HIV/AIDS, alcoholism, and poverty. “Findings by the research 
institute o f the Russian Federal Security Service project enormous numbers of 
deaths from tuberculosis,” he said. “Whereas only 7.7 of every 100 new Russian 
tuberculosis victims died in 1985, the death rate is now 25.5 per 100. According to 
official reports, the number o f tuberculosis deaths soared by 30 percent in the 1998- 
99 period. The 1999 death toll of 29,000 was about 15 times the toll in the United 
States, or nearly 30 times greater when measured as deaths per 100,000 population 
in both countries.” (Feshbach)
Tuberculosis, commonly referred to as TB, is a disease caused by the bacteria 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis. Usually attacking the lungs, these bacteria can attack 
any other part of the body. Once the leading cause of death in the United States, 
Tuberculosis is no longer the threat it once was (See table 3 for Russia v United 
States comparison). TB is an airborne disease. That is to say that when an infected 
person sneezes or coughs the bacteria discharges into the air and rapid proliferation 
can occur.
Tuberculosis runs rampant in Russian prisons precisely due to this. Those 
with deficient immune systems are highly vulnerable and so are those with 
substance abuse problems. Therefore Russian alcoholics are at high risk (CDC).
The problem of Tuberculosis proliferation in Russia will not correct itself 
anytime soon. In March 2005, a senior health ministry official told a news 
conference in Moscow that 188,000 new cases are registered each year and up to
30,000 of those die. Yekaterina Kakorina, deputy director of the Health Ministry’s
18
department for medical care and health resorts, said that Russia’s TB rate ran up to 
21.3 cases per 100,000 people in 2004. Moreover, she said that 83.1 new cases of 
TB per 100,000 were diagnosed last year {Moscow News).
Compounding this problem is the explosion o f HIV/AIDS. The increase of 
tuberculosis in Russia is closely related to HIV/AIDS, according to experts at the 
CSIS:
Those with HIV are at greater risk for contracting TB because of 
their depressed immune systems. The Red Cross estimates that Russia has
340,000 cases of TB, with 130,000 new cases each year. 30,000 people die 
from TB each year in Russia. In addition to an increase in overall rates, the 
proportion of multi-drug resistant TB is increasing (CSIS).
Additionally they opine that the Russian government is not doing enough to 
combat the spread of TB and warn that it must embark on a rigorous campaign, 
targeted at Russian youth, if there is to be hope in the future.
Table 3 Estimated Cases of Tuberculosis 2003
The Russian Federation & The United States
Source: WHO (GlobalAtlas)
United States of America
2003
HIV/AIDS
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The global challenge of trying to end the spread of HIV/AIDS has not 
bypassed Russia. In fact, many experts contend, the spread of this disease will not 
reach the apex o f its trajectory in the foreseeable future. Russian Politics and Law, 
a Russian scholarly journal, recently listed the challenges that Russia has to 
contend with and provided statistics that further enhance the opinion that this 
disease is one of the major health care issues that must be dealt with post-haste:
1. In Russia one in a hundred residents is infected with HIV.
2. The number of HIV-positive people in Russia is growing exponentially every year. In 
2003 over 253,000 HIV-infected Russian citizens were officially registered. On average, 
from 0.17 to 0.18 percent of the population is infected, but the numbers are higher in some 
regions. In the opinion of V. Pokrovskii, an academician of the Russian Academy of 
Medical Sciences who heads the Russian Federal Center for the Prevention and Control of 
HFV/AIDS, the real number of HIV-infected individuals in Russia is much higher, up to 
one million people.
3. In analyzing the ways in which HIV/AIDS is spreading throughout the Russian 
Federation, experts emphasize its epidemiological nature. Numerous studies, 
including those broadcast on television, have shown that at present the problems 
associated with AIDS are the center o f attention only within a narrow circle o f 
experts and among those who have the disease, those who are HIV-infected, and 
their loved ones.
20
4. The specific social characteristics of the spread o f the HIV infection in the 
Russian Federation are manifested as unique cultural traits—our citizens’ attitude 
toward the problem of AIDS, their low level o f awareness, their unusually infantile 
attitude toward measures o f personal safety, their inclination toward risky behavior, 
and so on. In addition, the presence of social problem zones, such as rising drug 
addiction, prostitution, and homosexuality, combined with a lack of preparation 
(both psychological and professional) among a majority of medical professionals 
for contact with HIV/AIDS-infected people, and the limited efficiency at 
prevention exhibited by centers for AIDS control all contribute to the spread of the 
infection throughout the post-Soviet space.
5. Almost one-fourth of Russia’s population lives below the poverty line. All this 
could not help but influence the spread of the AIDS epidemic in Russia.
6. The public is not well informed about the disease. In a 2002 survey 19% said they 
were sufficiently well informed. 35% responded that they were “somewhat” 
informed but not sufficiently. 44% said they were relatively poorly informed.
7. There is a direct correlation between crime, drug use and HIV/AIDS infection 
{Russian Politics and Law).
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AVERT.ORG is an international HIV and AIDS charity based in the UK, with 
the aim of averting HIV and AIDS worldwide. They provide table 4 below with 
statistics on Eastern European/Central Asia countries and HIV/AIDS diagnoses for 
2003. The perspective shown is startling. In regards to the total number of 
diagnoses, Russia accounts for a full 72% of the total o f all the countries. Russia’s 
rate of 275.5 per million is 62.5 more than the nearest country Ukraine and more 
than 100 more than the third place finisher, Latvia. Most frightening, Russia is 
responsible for 75% of total cases reported, with 206,002 more than the nearest 
country, again Ukraine. Clearly an epidemic has been in the making for some time.
Table 5 shows that from 1996 to 2003 Russia was second only to Estonia in 
Eastern Europe in the category of new infections. Russia shows over six hundred 
infections per million during this time frame, indicating approximately 90,000 new
cases. Table 4
Republic of Moldova 258 60.5 1,946
Russian Federation
Source:Avert, org
39,470 275.5 268,367
Tajikistan 42 6.7 119
Turkmenistan^ * * 2
Ukraine 10,009 206.3 62,365
Uzbekistan 1,836 70.4 3,596
Total 54,504 * 354,641
Kyrgyzstan 130 25.3 494
Latvia 403 174.7 2,710
Lithuania 110 31.9 845
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Table 5 Newly diagnosed HIV infections per million population 
in Eastern European and Central Asian countries, 1996-2003
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Fertility
The fertility rate in Russia is yet another cause of the declining 
population. When the Soviet Union collapsed the fertility rate followed right 
behind Going from a high in 1986/1987 of 2.19 births per woman to a low of 1.17 
in 1999 illustrates the sharp drop Fertility has increased slightly in the last few 
years, up to 1.4, but in 2001 the Council of Europe said the net reproduction rate 
was 59. They compared this to a rate of 1.0 that would signify the replacement of 
population. Table 6 shows the pattern over the past four decades (Eberstack).
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Vladimir Shkolnikov is a leading Russian demographer at the Max Planck 
Institute for Demographic Research in Rostock, Germany. He warns that the 
natural replacement rate of 2.1 is far out of reach for Russia at this time. "Overall, it 
should be understood very well that what we are talking about, this increase 
proclaimed by Goskomstat, I mean there is an increase, that's true, but this increase 
doesn't make a big difference demographically because this is an increase from the 
level 1.3 to the level of 1.4 and it has nothing to do with reaching the level of 
population replacement," he says (Brcmsten). Nicholas Eberstadt offers additional 
factors that have led to the declining rate:
First, Russia's poor and declining overall health patterns prevail in the 
realm of reproductive health as well—meaning that involuntary infertility
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is a more significant problem for Russia than for Western countries, and 
possibly a worsening one. Data on infertility for contemporary Russia are 
problematic. According to some recent reports, notwithstanding, Thirteen 
percent of Russia’s married couples of childbearing age are infertile, 
nearly twice the 7 percent figure for the United States in 1995 offered by 
the National Center for HealthStatistics. 10 Other Russian sources point to 
an even greater prevalence of infertility today, with numbers ranging 
“from 15 percent for couples, or even 15-20 percent for females and 5-10 
among males, or, alternatively, 30 percent of all males and females of 
childbearing age.” 11 Whatever the true level, medical diagnoses of 
infertility in Russia today are reportedly “on the rise”and that reported 
increase is unlikely to be an artifact. With respect to female infertility, 
Russia suffers today from two pronounced and highly unusual risks. First, 
Russian womanhood has, quite literally, been scarred by the country’s 
extraordinary popular reliance upon abortion as a primary means of 
contraception—with the abortions in question conducted under the less- 
than-exemplary standards of Soviet and post-Soviet medicine. Given past 
and existing patterns, a Russian woman can expect to have more abortions 
than births over the course of her childbearing years. In 1988, at the end of 
the Soviet era, Russian women underwent an officially tabulated 4.6 
million abortions—two for every live birth (Eberstadt).
Overall view of the health system
The overall health system in Russia is one that Americans offifty  years ago 
would have thought woefully inadequate. In The Wall Street Journal, Dr. Alexei 
Serov described a scene that is happening all around the country. Pipes had begun 
bursting in his maternity hospital while he watched the plaster falling from the 
walls. The building, not renovated in 40 years, was closed by health regulators, and
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Dr. Serov was forced to move his patients to temporary quarters across the street. 
With no elevators to move his pregnant patients from floor to floor, conditions 
were not much better than at the hospital. There was a Tuberculosis clinic next door 
that must have terrified the expecting mothers. "We physicians are working on the 
razor's edge," says Dr. Serov, who earns the equivalent of $130 a month. "All our 
problems boil down to a lack of financing. "(Whalen) This is evidenced by the fact 
that two children had died within the last year but would have survived with a 
$15,000 breathing machine (WSJ).
The article also reminds that up until 1991 health care was free to citizens of 
the Soviet Union; however, the quality of care equaled your level o f social and/or 
Communist Party status. Although health care is still state subsidized the funding 
has been cut by a third, resulting in patients having to foot the rest of the bill. Even 
with a doctor, such as Dr. Servov, making only $130 per month, health care is 
simply something many Russians must live without.
Another story shows that just being born in Russia can be dangerous. In 
January of last year six premature babies lost their lives due to the nurses failing to 
sanitize the breathing machines the infants needed to survive. The chief doctor of 
the hospital was fired, and a state inquiry concluded that the accidents were caused 
by a “lack of qualified personnel and equipment.’’(Whalen) President Putin has 
been advised to cut back on free health care and move toward a privatized system. 
As we know here in the United States, the quality o f health care is excellent in a 
privatized system. Putin, though, is wary of doing anything that may damage his
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high approval ratings. Certainly if health care stays in the states’ hands it will not 
improve in any measurable degree (Whalen).
The babies discussed above, if they had survived, would not have had a very 
long life to look forward to, compared to the United States and other countries in 
the West and Europe. Tables 7 & 8 below, show just how far Russia has to go for 
female and male life expectancy at birth In 1999 the average Russian male was 
expected to live to age 61. The same male in the United States could add another 
twelve years and die at 73. For female Russian babies the gap is strikingly 
narrower. The life expectancy for them is 72 compared to 79 for the American 
females.
Table 7 Expectation of Life at Birth for Males (Source:Anderson)
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Table 8 Expectation of Life at Birth for Females (Source.-Anderson)
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The figures for 2002, the latest available, show that life expectancy has not 
become better since 1999, according to Kent R. Hill, Assistant Administrator for 
Europe and Eurasia U.S. Agency for International Development. In testimony 
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Mr. Hill said, “The largest 
gender differences in life expectancy ’worldwide are found in Eurasian countries 
Russian females with a life expectancy of 72, for example, live 13 years longer than 
Russian males (59 years).” (USAID)
Yuriy Komarov, vice president of the Russian Medical Association adds a 
frightening perspective to the life expectancy issue. Speaking to the Fifth Pirigov 
All-Russia Congress of Doctors he said, “Today, the difference in the life 
expectancy of Russians and the inhabitants of developed countries aboard is 15-18 
years. Something like 100 years will be needed to close the gap.”(JTas/?. Times) 
Komarov added that the prematur e death rate is higher than almost 100 years ago in
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Russia, and that if basic medical treatment was available nationwide, 40% of 
premature deaths could be avoided {Wash. Times).
Debra Javeline o f The Kennan Institute, quoted earlier in regards to Russia’s 
alcoholism, cites a number of challenges that are presented by Russia’s health 
system.
1. According to the World Health Organization, by 1999, 3.5 million Russians (out of 
145 million) were treated for psychological disorders, and more than one-third of 
Russians, or 52 million people, have “psychological disorders of various degrees.”
2. Suicides in Russia have climbed from roughly 26 per 100,000 people in 1990 to 
roughly 40 in 2000, representing an increase of more than 50 percent in only a 
decade.
3. In terms o f nutrition, Russians have a poor diet. They consume increasing quantities 
o f potatoes and bread, sacrifice more nutritious meat, vegetables, and fruit, and 
suffer important vitamin and mineral deficiencies.
4. In terms of morbidity, Russians are increasingly prone to diseases like tuberculosis, 
cholera, diphtheria, polio, and heart disease.
5. In terms o f mortality, Russians are dying. They are dying at rates that are alarming 
for a supposedly postindustrial country, and they are dying for reasons that are 
similarly alarming, like alcohol abuse and accidents. The rate of mortality has 
increased significantly for all age groups, and at its most extreme, it has doubled 
for men between the ages of forty and forty-four years, giving Russian men the 
highest rate o f death in Europe.
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6. The principal victims of Russia’s health crisis are middle-aged men, especially 
those aged forty to forty-four years. Between poverty and death, some mechanism 
is intervening, and that mechanism is likely psychological or emotional. 
Specifically, powerlessness, hopelessness, or “loss of control” is the likely 
intervening variable. Identifying loss of control as the problem sheds light on why 
Russia’s two leading causes of death are cardiovascular disease and alcohol abuse 
(which features prominently in accidents or “death by external causes” in Russia). 
Both causes o f death are more prevalent among individuals who perceive a loss o f 
control. Stress from lost control is said to be especially prominent among 
individuals who have experienced “status loss events” such as unemployment, 
divorce, the death o f a loved one, and other losses of income, power, and prestige. 
In the case of Russians and other post-Soviet citizens, most have experienced such 
status loss events on a personal level while also sharing in their country’s major 
loss of status from a world superpower to developing world charity case. The 
resulting stress in turn can affect health directly by causing disease. Stress affects 
the nervous system, the neuroendocrine system, the immune system, and the 
cardiovascular system, and it leads to a higher risk for a whole range o f illnesses, 
including hypertension, heart attack, gastric problems, stroke, ulcers, colitis, 
diabetes, infectious disease, and cancer (Javeline).
The state of Russia’s health system has advanced little since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Russian’s, accustomed to state funded health care under
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communism, struggle with assuming more responsibility for their own health care. 
However, the state must assume more responsibility o f its’ own. It must devote 
more resources to the infrastructure o f the health system, as well as prevention 
programs for disease targeted at the youth. Russia cannot afford not to do this, if it 
desires to reverse the trend o f de-population.
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Chapter II
Effects
The effects of Russia’s population decline may appear to be obvious. In 
terms of national security the demographic that the army depends on is dying. 
There simply will not be enough young fit males to fill the ranks. Likewise for the 
people needed to work in the factories, keep the trains running, etc. Moreover, the 
people who are not dying are getting older. “In recent decades, the number of 
persons aged 60 and over has doubled. The number of older persons will continue 
to grow in coming years, and the ratio o f retired people to working-age people will 
increase. Between 2005 and 2020, for example, this ratio will increase by 50 
percent,” says Julie DaVanzo and Clifford Grammich, both analysts from RAND 
{Rand). Assuming the analysts are correct, Russia will have to make dramatic steps 
forward in the area of technology to make up for the loss in manpower. Table 9 
indicates the seriousness o f Russia’s population that is economically active. The 
30-40 age group is the most active, with at 90.1 percent economically active. The 
percentages trail off down to the 55-59 age group where only 49.7% are 
economically active. This is compared to 69.5% in the United States, where the 
years 55-59 are considered prime earning years (ILO). As Russia’s population 
continues to age, those available to be productive members of the labor force will 
dramatically decline, further worsening the economic outlook. After the age of 59, 
the table shows, hardly anyone is working, and the 18 million over 65 will be dying
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off rapidly in the coming years. In the United States, 46 8% of those between 60 
and 64 are still working compared to only 15.5 percent in Russia.
Table 9
Total Men Women
Act
Age
group Total
population
Active
population
Activity
rate
Total
populat
ion
Active
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0
Total 146740.000 66736.000 45.5 68820.000
35273.00
0 51.3
77920.00
0 31464.000
40.
4
Total
(15+ ) 117722.000 66736.000 56 7
35273.00
G 31465.000
0-9 16664.00C .
10-14 12354.000
15-19 11132.000 1558.000 13.9 775.000 783.000
20-24 10527,000 7096.000 67.4 3941.000 3155.000
25-29 9849.000 7980.000 81.0 4489.000 3491.000
3 0 -3 4 10170.000 9166.000 90.1 4892.000 4274.000
3 5 -39 12738.000 11351.000 89.1 5829.000 5522.000
4 0 -4 4 12240.000 10629,000 86.8 5264.000 5365.000
4 5 -4 9 10802.000 8991.000 83.2 4373.000 4618.000
50-54 5915.000 4111.000 69.5 2012.000 2100.00C
55 -59 8510.000 4228.000 49 .7 2736.000 1492.000
6 0 -6 4 7404.000 1147 000 15.5 697.000 450.000
65+ 13385.000 479,000 2.6 265.000 215 000
Source. International Labour Organization
The military is facing similar shortages according to Dmitry Trenin o f the 
Carnegie Moscow Center. “The General Staff is having a difficult time mustering 
the 100-120 thousand servicemen for the campaign in Chechnya. And the 
composition of the Armed Forces today is absurd: it has more officers than privates 
and as many colonels as lieutenants.” (MCC)
The decline in numbers of the overall population, especially those of 
service age, is forcing the army to conscript those that are not military worthy. In
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short, the quality and quantity of Russian soldiers is declining. For example, 
securing 9.5% of the entire draft base in the spring 2004 draft was far too small, 
according to Colonel-General Vasily Smirnov, head o f the General Staffs main 
organization and mobilization directorate (McDermott). Roger McDermott, o f the 
Jamestown Foundation adds that, “It has been in steady decline during the last 
decade, with around 27% accepted from the draft base in 1994. Unfortunately, the 
Presidential team considers the same draft a success, since it collected 95% of the 
fixed-term soldiers the army requires. Such a positive spin diverts attention from 
the real horror of the draft: the poor quality of the new draftees. ”(McDermott) 
Moreover, McDermott notes that many fail the medical and get a reprieve from the 
unpopular military service, and Russian medical doctors, according to reports, 
judged 50% of draftees to have "limited suitability" on health grounds. This has a 
direct affect on manning the higher readiness formations and Special Forces. Not 
only is the supply of men o f draft age dwindling, the quality o f recruits is also 
faltering; 25% o f draftees have only eight years of education, 6% were registered 
with the local police, 2.7% were known to have a drug-related problem, and 5% 
had a criminal record.
Not surprisingly the General Staff solution to these manpower problems is 
simply to increase the number of draftees from the current draft base by up to 2.5 
times over the next five years. The entire draft base currently is 1.6 million, and is 
expected to decrease to between 800,000 and 1 million within two or three years. 
Concluding, McDermott said, “If  the army switches to a 12-month term for draft
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service, it would have to recruit 200,000 in each draft campaign, around 20-25% of 
the total number of conscripts. In other words, the General Staff vision entails 
returning to higher percentage levels than the Russian armed forces recruited in 
1994.” (Eurasia Daily Monitor)
In 2000 the United Nations convened an expert group to discuss population 
decline and population ageing in the Russian Federation. The group noted the 
following:
• The most urgent problem for the economy of Russia caused by the population 
ageing will be the rising pressure on the government budget and more strong 
necessity o f financing the pension and social security systems.
• In Russia, the government pension system fails to provide somewhat normal 
standard of living for the elderly people. Despite o f the measures intended to 
increase pensions, the mean size of the appointed pensions is still below the 
pensionary cost o f living. Even the improvement o f the economic situation will not 
necessary increase the pension fund contributions to a marked degree because 
according to the Goskomstat projection the number o f the working-age persons 
who are the main tax bearers will start to decrease since 2006. The absence of the 
integrated reforms will cause in the long-term perspective a dangerous aggravation 
of the financial status o f the pension system which will take place under the 
influence o f the gradual ageing of the population of Russia.
• The increase in the number of old persons will demand for the development of 
the social support services for the lonely elderly people and expansion of the
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network o f the old people s homes and boarding houses. Currently, these 
institutions in Russia experience serious problems with the material and personnel 
maintenance.
• The increase o f the share of the elderly persons with higher needs in medical 
treatment will cause a stronger load as regards the medical establishments. The 
latter will require the reorganization o f the public health system with the purpose of 
improving geriatric care. For all age groups, it is necessary to improve the 
information on health, including reproductive health and food because the health of 
the old persons depends both on the quality of the rendered medical services and 
living conditions and on the status o f health during the young years.
• The share of the population of older age groups within the total population will 
increase. By 2016, each fifth inhabitant o f Russia will be in the age of 60 years and 
more.
• The potential support ratio (the number o f the persons of the working age per 
person o f past working-age) will decline from 3 at the beginning of the 2000 to 2.3 
by 2016. However, the cumulative potential support ratio (children and the persons 
of the past working-age) by 2016 would not exceed the level o f2000 -  1.5 persons, 
due to the decline o f the share o f children within the total population. (U.N. Pop. 
Center)
There is a direct correlation between health and economic productivity. In a 
wealthy country, such as the United States, they compliment and reinforce each 
other. If there is good health care, that spurs economic productivity from an active
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populace. When there is economic activity the needed resources for health care are 
produced. Therefore Russia cannot expect to have a consistently active economy 
when its population, especially the young who produce, is growing smaller. Natural 
resource revenues will not suffice indefinitely. “Apart from the obvious military 
implications of the envisioned disproportionate decline o f the age group from 
which army manpower is traditionally drawn, there would be economic and social 
reverberations as well,” says Eberstadt. “With fewer young people rising to replace 
the older retirees graduating from the Russian workforce, the question of improving 
(or perhaps maintaining) the average level of skills and qualifications in the 
economically active population would become that much more pressing. And since 
younger people the world over tend to be disposed toward and associated with 
certain kinds o f discovery, innovation, and entrepreneurial risk-taking, a 
pronounced choke-off of younger blood could have intangible, but real, 
consequences for Russia’s social capabilities and economic responsiveness.” 
(Eberstadt)
The two major problems created by Russia’s population decline are clear. They 
are national security and economic security. The army is finding it difficult to fill 
the ranks, and as said above, the proportion of officers to enlisted men is seriously 
out o f balance. The army is growing increasingly dependent on conscripts that have 
little or no education and many have had problems with the law. The tangible 
components o f the military are outdated so there must be technological advances 
made in weaponry. If  Russia does happen to be able to modernize the military, it
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will need highly trained and educated recruits. Currently the army is trying to 
sustain itself with large numbers o f troops. That will not suffice for long if it hopes 
to be able to defend the long borders that span eleven times zones. Brains, rather 
than brawn, will be needed in the future.
The problem of simply having enough people to work and provide economic 
productivity is a challenge that Russia will have for decades to come. The available 
work force continues to shrink as the population gets older. In contrast to the 
United States and other western countries, the younger generations are not 
sustaining the population, so there will be fewer people to replace them in the 
workforce as they move into middle-age and retirement. Therefore, population 
growth must be the top priority o f the Russian government.
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Chapter HI
The Solution
Immigration
Russia must develop a plan to increase the population, as all indications are 
that the population will drop by a third to around 100 million in 2050 (U.S. 
Census). As established earlier the population is growing older, and by 2050 the 
majority will be at or near retirement age. Increasing births, although a logical step 
which must be encouraged, will not provide the needed relief in the short term. 
This leaves only one viable alternative, increasing immigration.
The Kremlin must develop an immigration plan that will provide immediate 
relief to its aging work force problem. Immigration is happening but is not at the 
level of population replacement. The need for a higher level o f immigration, 
however, is an issue that must take a back seat for a moment to discuss the problem 
of emigration, those that are leaving Russia for greener pastures. In many circles 
this is referred to as “brain drain.”
The problem o f emigration, or brain drain, is not a new phenomenon, 
according to Tat’iana Naumova in Russian Politics and Law (Naumova). She notes 
the fact that Europe experienced this in a high degree during the 1940s and 1950s 
when academics, intellectuals and scientists were leaving Europe in droves for the
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west, most notably the United States. At this time though it was not for greener 
pastures, but to escape the oppression and war that was enveloping the continent. 
The numbers leaving Russia have been large, said Naumova, noting that Russia’s 
Security Council estimated that two hundred thousand scholars had left the country 
by the end of the twentieth century. She provides the causes that she believes have 
been the root of the problem:
• Negative developments in the Russian economy have led to a situation in 
which science is no longer in demand in Russian society. The causes o f 
contemporary academic emigration are closely linked to the general crisis of 
science in Russia, primarily a response to the dramatic reduction of scientific 
investment (by twelve times in the span of a decade). As the experience of 
scientifically and technologically advanced countries has shown, the share of state 
funding in scientific development cannot fall below 2 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP) without that important area of public life beginning to decline. In 
2003 Russian state funding for science made up 0.31 percent of the GDP, whereas 
until recently the value of that indicator in our country had been one of the highest 
in the world.
•  In leading countries with highly developed economies, intellectuals are a 
respected part of society. In the United States and Japan, the average academic 
salary is twice that in the national economy as a whole. Even the neighboring post­
socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which are implementing radical 
market and democratic reforms, have higher real academic salaries and living 
standards than Russia does, although the role of science there is also on the decline. 
As is well known, in our country academic salaries are below the subsistence wage 
and lag far behind the average national salary. Moreover, we should take into 
account that many Russian academics depend on their salaries as their main source
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of income, which makes this one of the main factors determining their welfare. 
Most of them receive a salary that can provide neither a dignified living standard 
nor an acceptable social position. Quite a few scholars are simply forced to look for 
nonacademic sources o f income.
•  The collapse o f the Soviet Union destroyed the integrated academic space, 
broke up the academies of sciences in the former Soviet republics, led to the demise 
o f scientific schools (which were in essence Russian schools), and ruptured ties 
formed in the course o f history. Millions o f our compatriots found themselves 
beyond Russia’s boundaries, and these included quite a few scholars.
•  Most academics have only one practical form o f capital left—their rather high 
level o f professionalism, industriousness, and efficiency. The intellectuals who 
have come back to Russia have turned out to be very vulnerable under conditions 
of labor-market competition. Studies show that scholars have few chances to find 
jobs in their areas of expertise in Russia.
•  The contradictory nature o f the radical reforms in Russia has had a dramatic 
impact on values in our society. The systemic crisis has produced a conflict over 
the hierarchy o f values, and the prestige o f intellectual work has dramatically 
declined in the public mind. This is not a situation based on considerations of the 
moment but a prospect for many years to come. The growing antiscientific 
sentiment that has emerged in Russian culture, an outgrowth of our society’s sense 
of crisis, has contributed to scholarship’s now having little prestige.
•  These days, antiscientific sentiment among the public is quite strong. Scientific 
mastery among the young has begun to decline. Studies show that graduate schools 
have difficulty filling their enrollments, since a negligible number of respondents 
prefer to take that route. The decline in the prestige of scientific work is 
catastrophic, and the social status o f scholars has plummeted: one can say that it 
has never been as low as it is at present (Naumova).
41
The preceding points have had dire consequences for Russia as a whole. The 
lack of prestige for what I will call the intellectuals has influenced the younger 
population to avoid the sciences. This has caused further harm to Russia’s ability to 
produce technological advances to keep up with the west. Once on an even par with 
the west, Russia finds itself falling further and further behind. O f course Russia’s 
loss is our gain. The intellectuals that were once heralded in Russia are now helping 
the United States to become more advanced and more competitive in the global 
economy. O f course the psychological effect is felt as well. Many Russians are 
despondent over the loss o f Russian prestige in the world after 1991, and this 
further enhances that despondence. Those feeling this way will either fall deeper 
into despair or decide to leave themselves.
All is not so bad, argues Timothy Heleniak in the Journal o f  International 
Affairs. He stipulates that, yes, Russia is experiencing a level o f brain drain, but it is 
also benefiting from an influx o f “brains” from peripheral areas. “However, an 
overlooked fact is that as Russia loses persons to the far abroad, it is gaining them 
from the other FSU states,” he contends:
The Russian diaspora population in the other FSU states disproportionately 
tended to be highly educated urban dwellers, and it is those populations who 
have decided to return in the largest numbers. In addition, many highly 
educated and skilled members o f the non-Russian nationalities have chosen 
to migrate to Russia, either permanently or temporarily. While Russia may 
indeed have lost large portions of persons among select, highly specialized 
occupations, overall the country seems to have greatly increased the
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educational level o f its population through migration during the post-Soviet 
period, largely at the expense of the other FSU states. (Heleniak)
There is no doubt though that the status of intellectuals in Russia has declined, 
and something must be done to reverse that trend. Even if  Russia is getting a 
portion of these back from the FSU, it must address the problem o f declining 
enrollments in scientific studies. To do this it must address the problem o f low 
salaries, and it must ensure that the jobs the intellectuals are qualified for have a 
high level o f prestige. Heleniak misses the important point that those who are 
migrating back to Russia are not going to stay if  they are looked down upon and are 
not compensated well for their services. You cannot simply rely on the emigrating 
intellectuals being replaced from the FSU. That will prove to be a benefit in the 
short term but dismisses the root of the problem. However, in a policy memo, 
Theodore Gerber of Arizona State University agrees in part with Heleniak:
Given the unremitting crisis in Russia's economy since 1991, it may 
surprise some that Russia has been a net recipient of migrants throughout 
the transition period. Although the migration rate peaked in 1994, it has 
been positive throughout the period and remained fairly stable in 
subsequent years. The bulk of this in-migration consists o f ethnic Russians 
"returning” to the Russian Federation from other CIS countries for either 
economic or political reasons. Russian policy gives all Russian nationals 
the formal right to reside in Russia. Many such immigrants receive official
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status as "forced migrants," which formally entitles them to receive some 
assistance from the Federal Migration Service. However, the FMS, which 
first and foremost fulfills monitoring and regulatory functions, is severely 
underfinanced and plagued by inconsistent practices in its regional offices 
(Gerber).
Gerber notes that there are problems associated with this influx o f migrants that 
are not typically recognized. First, he stipulates that one may view this migration as 
a “positive development” in helping to offset the decline in population. However, 
he also suggests that Russia cannot take care o f the people it already has, so the 
immigrants will only tax the system more. “Russia's constricted housing market, 
negative growth, and decaying infrastructure are ill-prepared for influxes of 
migrants,” he says (Gerber). He also notes that frequent media reports focus on 
common problems that are typically associated with large numbers of migrants. 
The problems o f high crime rates, unemployment, epidemics, and housing 
shortages suggest that immigrants from the FSU come from all levels on the socio­
economic scale (Gerber).
Russia is experiencing a net immigration increase according to the latest 
statistics available. That is to say that more people are immigrating to Russia than 
are emigrating from  Russia. Table 10 shows that in 2000 Russia gained 350,874 
and lost 161,178 for a net gain of 189,696. The following year the net gain 
decreased dramatically but still managed to stay on the plus side with a net gain of
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49,840. Table 11 indicates that historically, the net migration rate has remained 
relatively flat save for a small surge in the few years following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.
Table 10 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: RUSSIAN FEDERATION
2000 2001
Arrived in the Russian Federation, total 350874 187413
among them from the countries of
CIS and Baltic region 350288 186226
other regions 533 1187
Emigrated from the Russian Federation, total 161178 137573
among them to the countries of:
CIS and Baltic region 83438 62545
other regions1* 77740 75028
Migration increase, decrease (-), total 
including the result of migration exchange with the 
countries oP
189696 49840
CIS and Baltic region 
other regions
266850
-77154
123681
-73841
Source: Russian Federal State Statistics Service 
■ able 11 (Source: Anderson)
FIGURE 2. C om ponents of Population Growth In Russia - Rates per 
T housand  Population
■Set Ir-nr arattoo Rate
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Christof Ruehl, Chief Economist, The World Bank Russia Country 
Department, makes several excellent points on the effects o f immigration:
Many observers voice the concern that open borders have exacerbated 
Russia’s economic problems due to the “brain-drain”, i.e. the outflow of 
young well-educated people. By official estimates, Russia lost an 
additional 1.1 million people to emigration from the start of reforms until 
2002 (almost all to Germany, Israel and the US), and indeed mostly of 
working age and with above-average education. However, immigration 
prevented an even more rapid depletion of Russia's human resources. 
First, with new arrivals outweighing departures, positive net immigration 
of 5.6 million reduced the natural population decline from 5 percent of 
Russia’s 1989 population to about 1.2 percent (these are 2002 census 
estimates, while other estimates are even more optimistic). And second, 
the quality o f immigration has been relatively high: In every single 
category, by education level as well as by age group, Russia has received 
more people than it lost. So from the economic perspective, immigration 
has greatly cushioned the blow to Russia's human resources. 
The conclusions for economic policy are obvious and have been drawn 
before: In an economic perspective the main issue raised by immigration 
is not how to restrict it, but how to define a policy that manages the
46
inflows. This is particularly true as the “supply” of immigrants from ex- 
Soviet republics dries up and the question of immigration to Russia from 
elsewhere becomes more topical. In finding answers to such questions, 
Russia faces exactly the same kind o f problems, which most EU 
economies have to wrestle with {Ruehl).
Many economists and demographers believe that Russia needs several 
hundred thousand migrants each year just to keep major industries working. The 
theory is that this influx o f workers would need to be kept up until the country 
grows wealthy enough to afford better social programs, thereby cutting the death 
rate and raising the birth rate. “This need makes immigration policy one of the most 
important, if not the most important, part of national security planning,” said Davlat 
Khudonazarov a visiting scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center in 
Washington and former member of the Supreme Soviet. “Now would be the most 
favorable time to accept more migrants from former Soviet republics like 
Tajikistan, people who would like to live and work in Russia. They were once 
citizens o f the same country as Russians, and they share the same past and 
historical fate. In a mere 15 years, migrants and Russians will not share these 
things.” {Moscow Times)
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Russia at least appears to acknowledge the need for more labor via 
immigration. On March 17’ 2005, Russian President Putin addressed the 
immigration matter in remarks to the Security Council:
An effectively implemented immigration policy is of critical importance 
for our country. We need to act rapidly to adjust our immigration policy 
strategy and turn the problems of the past into an advantage for the future.
In order to achieve this, we first need to make improvements to the 
state immigration policy and we also need to tie it in more closely with our 
country’s real social and economic development needs.
It is clear that immigration issues require constant and vigilant 
attention. This is partly because Russia has international obligations it 
must abide by, but even more, it is because we must take urgent steps to 
resolve the country’s economic and demographic problems.
We all know that Russia’s working population is on the decline 
and that it will not be long before this begins to have a negative effect on 
our economic growth and on our ability to fulfill various social 
commitments.
According to the Federal Migration Service, immigration flows are 
decreasing with every passing year. It is a fact today that immigration no 
longer has a positive effect on the demographic situation in the country. It 
no longer compensates for the natural population decline, as was the case 
in the mid-1990s.
Many countries have successfully resolved similar problems and 
continue to do so. Their success has been thanks to a competent 
immigration policy. They put in place targeted policies to encourage 
people with capital, knowledge and good qualifications into their 
economic, scientific and cultural spheres.
Indeed, our specialists are also among those who leave for
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countries with an effective immigration policy. We are well aware of this. 
Specialists estimate that more than 100,000 scientists working in what 
have been traditionally strong sectors in Russia such as mathematics, 
chemistry, physics and biology left the country between 1989 and 2001. 
Most of these people were mature people aged 35-45.
We must continue to work on ensuring good living and working 
conditions for our specialists in their native country, but at the same time 
we should also take steps to ensure that foreign specialists and qualified 
workers find suitable living conditions here in Russia. Our primary task 
today is to encourage immigration. I stress that we are talking about 
encouraging immigration and not just compensating for our population 
decline.
Some Russian entrepreneurs are interested, of course, in having a 
cheap labor force. Indeed, some specialists even say that this is one of 
Russia’s economic advantages. But at the same time, this disorder and 
these unclear naturalization procedures for immigrants eventually cause 
damage to the state, society and the economy.
We are well aware that some regions face quite an acute situation 
with a rapid increase in the number of immigrant workers. But we have to 
be particularly attentive when dealing with such problems and it is 
extremely important that the entire system of state power have a common 
view and implement a coordinated state policy regarding all the principal 
immigration issues.
I would also like to point out that immigration policy is a powerful 
instrument for consolidating the countries o f the Commonwealth of 
Independent States. People who come to Russia from the CIS countries 
can make a real contribution to strengthening our integration. Ensuring 
that they can legally work and live a normal social life here is one of the 
ways in which we can build up our cooperation with our closest partners.
49
Drawing on these people is the most natural way for us to attract the labor 
force we need. After all, what is important to us is not religion, skin color 
or other ethnic factors, but the fact that practically all these people speak 
Russian and know Russian culture. They have no problem adapting to 
Russian life. This is a huge advantage for us, an advantage that other 
countries do not have. Take Western Europe, where there is a flow of 
immigrants from other regions, from North Africa and Latin America, for 
example. It is a complicated situation there because these immigrants take 
decades to adapt to life in European countries. Only the second and third 
generation really manages to adapt. We don’t have this problem and we 
should make use of this advantage {Kremlin).
Putin, at least on the surface, does appear to have a grasp on the problem, 
but whether he takes concrete action we will just have to wait and see. So far in his 
regime, what he says and what takes place are two different things. He is correct in 
believing that there is plenty o f labor surrounding Russia that can be capitalized on, 
most notably the Central Asian states o f the FSU. Indeed, Russia has become the 
primary destination for unskilled migrants from these states. Due to major 
unemployment, poor social conditions, and poverty, these migrants from countries 
such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are filling the need in Russia for unskilled 
workers. Not unlike Mexican immigrants to the United States, these migrants are 
taking the jobs that the ordinary Russian does not want. A bonus is that the 
majority o f these migrants are familiar with Russian culture and most o f them 
speak the language, a stark contrast to the Mexicans flowing into the United States.
The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs recently issued 
report on this status o f this immigration from Central Asia:
THE NUMBER OF LABOUR MIGRANTS
According to a recent study by the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) on illegal labour in Russia, there were 3.5 to 5 million illegal labour 
migrants in the country, mainly from Commonwealth o f Independent States 
(CIS) countries, including Central Asia. Tyuryukanova, who headed the 
project, estimated that around 30 to 40 percent of these workers - up to 2 
million people - may come from Central Asia, with Tajiks - among the 
poorest in the region - leading the list.
TAJIK LABOUR MIGRANTS
Hakim Muhabbatov, a Moscow-based expert on Tajik labour migrants, 
told IRIN that the large flow o f Tajiks into the country could be attributed to 
poor social and economic conditions in the country, still reeling from five 
years o f civil war in the 1990s.
According to the World Bank, Tajikistan is the poorest o f the 
former Soviet republics, with over 80 percent o f its population living below 
the national poverty line. Salaries average just US $11 a month, while the 
minimum wage is a mere $2, figures that make it hard to understand how 
people survive. By comparison, an average monthly salary in Russia is 
around $120, with those in Moscow being more than $500.
Tajik labour migrants in Russia are generally aged between 16 and 40, 
with 75-80 per cent being men. Most of these migrants do unskilled jobs that 
Russians are reluctant to take up, such as work at markets, construction sites, 
food services and as farm labour.
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KYRGYZ LABOUR MIGRANTS
The second largest group of Central Asian labour migrants in Russia 
comes from Tajikistan's northern neighbour, Kyrgyzstan. Janybek, 32, came 
to Moscow to work as a construction worker together with his two friends 
from the southern Kyrgyz province o f Batken more than two years ago. Now 
he works cleaning streets in one o f Moscow's poorer districts. "I plan to bring 
my wife here," said Janybek. "I have this job and it pays $200 [a month], 
which is quite good. As long as we have such an opportunity we will keep 
working here.”
He is not alone. Some analysts estimate that more than 500,000 labour 
migrants from Kyrgyzstan are currently working in Russia. However, Askar 
Beshimov, the consul-general o f the Kyrgyz Embassy in Russia, claimed that 
their numbers were no more than 30,000.
Dairbek Aliev, another Kyrgyz labour migrant, arrived in Moscow 
almost a year ago. "First, I was hired by Donstroy [a local construction 
company], where I worked for seven months but was paid only for two," the 
21-year-old lamented. "All the workers there - amongst whom were Tajiks, 
Turkmen and Uzbeks - were hired informally without labour agreements," he 
said, adding that many were required to work the first two or three months for 
free in return for the 'employment' opportunity. "This was kind of a bribe for 
hiring us to work for them," Dairbek explained.
UZBEK LABOUR MIGRANTS
As for Uzbekistan, although the precise number of labor migrants 
working in Russia is not known, the number o f such migrants leaving for 
South Korea, Russia and Kazakhstan from Central Asia's most populous 
nation has reportedly increased. According to the Uzbek Ministry of Labor, 
more than 600,000 to 700,000 Uzbek citizens are working in various 
countries. Some experts suggest that Russia's Samara province, 600 km
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southeast of the capital, may alone host up to 24,000 Uzbek migrants.
They are dispersed over the whole of European Russia, says Nikolay 
Mitrohin, a representative of the Moscow-based Memorial human rights 
organisation. Primarily engaged in agricultural, general services (restaurants 
and cafes), bazaars and construction work, Uzbek migrants find the pay in 
Russia quite favourable compared to the average ($20-30 a month) back 
home.
TURKMEN LABOUR MIGRANTS
The numbers o f Turkmen labor migrants in Russia, by contrast, are 
limited given the reclusive policy o f the Turkmen government and severe 
restrictions on traveling abroad. Since the autumn o f 1994 all transport 
routes, except for air links, were closed between the two countries. 
Additionally, the controversial political status of ethnic Russians living in 
Turkmenistan has contributed to a fall in migration from the energy-rich, but 
increasingly poor, Central Asian state. Experts comment that, unlike 
ordinary citizens, only those who work in the gas and petroleum refining 
industries in western Turkmenistan are able to travel to the Russian cities of 
Tyumen and Yamal by plane. Nevertheless, there are still many Turkmen 
migrants who work in Russia's booming construction sector, particularly in 
larger urban areas like Moscow. And while their status is no different from 
their counterparts from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, reliable statistics on their 
actual numbers remain hard to come by.
KAZAKHSTAN LABOUR MIGRANTS
Kazakhstan - the leader in Central Asia in terms of economic growth - 
has the lowest level o f labor migration to Russia. "Kazakhstan is the country 
which has the fewest number of migrants per capita amongst Central Asian 
countries," Andrey Grozin, head of the Central Asia and Kazakhstan 
department at the Moscow-based Institute of Commonwealth o f Independent
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States (ICIS), told IRIN, citing comparatively higher social and economic 
growth indicators as the main contributing factor.
Kazakhstan has enjoyed annual economic growth of some 10 percent 
over the past years, boosted mainly by the oil industry. The average monthly 
salary in the largest Central Asian country is the highest among the CIS 
countries, almost $170. However, a number o f highly skilled Kazakh labor 
migrants can be found in Russia's petroleum refining industry in eastern 
Siberia region. Additionally, Kazakhstan, just as Russia, hosts a substantial 
number of migrants coming from neighboring Central Asian countries.
IMPACT ON RUSSIAN ECONOMY
There are conflicting views on whether labor migration is good or bad 
for the Russian economy. Some say that migrants deprive local Russians of 
jobs, making competition more intense. But others maintain that migrants 
usually do the jobs that locals themselves are reluctant to do.
According to Tyuryukanova, in some industries, on average 40 percent 
o f jobs were done by migrants and often a migrant took over following a 
local workers' refusal to fill the job. "This is a situation where a certain niche 
is firmly occupied by the migrants," she explained. But for the rest there 
could be competition for jobs between migrants and locals, she conceded. 
"They do not come to Russia with the purpose of staying here long-term or 
permanently. The results o f our surveys indicate that these migrants come 
here with short-term goals, related to earning money from temporary jobs," 
said Svetlana Soboleva, a scientist conducting research on Central Asian 
migrants in Siberia (U .N Office).
The migrants are not only coming from Central Asia, however. In fact, 
“Over the past 10 years, Russia has become the migration magnet for the rest of 
Eurasia,” stated Fiona Hill, a Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the
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Brookings Institution, at a 27 September 2004 Kennan Institute lecture. “We’ve 
literally had millions of economic migrants moving into places like Moscow, St. 
Petersburg, and many other Russian cities in search of work and a better life.” 
(Hill) Between 1991 and 2001, an average of 790,000 people immigrated to Russia 
annually; only the United States and Germany receive more immigrants per year. 
Among Hill’s major observations are the following:
•  Russia has experienced positive net migration since 1991, with the majority of 
immigrants arriving from other Soviet successor states. Ethnic Russians migrating 
to their titular homeland from other Soviet republics comprised nearly 60 percent 
o f total immigration to Russia between 1989 and 2002. However, Hill noted that 
these numbers reflect only legal migration. She argued that significant numbers of 
non-Russian labor migrants have come to Russia from the Caucasus and Central 
Asia, often illegally. As many as 2 million Azerbaijanis, 1 million Armenians,
650,000 Tajiks, 500,000 Georgians and Kyrgyz, and 100,000 Uzbeks may be 
working in the Russian Federation.
•  High levels of immigration have affected Russia in a number o f ways—many 
of which have been very beneficial to the country. The Russian economy has more 
than doubled since 1999 and domestic demand has increased significantly. 
Immigrant entrepreneurs provide Russian consumers with cheap goods (primarily 
from Asia and the Middle East), which is particularly important in Siberia and the 
Far East, where transportation costs make goods from European Russia 
prohibitively expensive. In addition, cheap labor is filling a void inside Russia
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itself, the whole of the lower-paying sectors in the Russian economy are 
increasingly being filled by migrants from elsewhere in the CIS.
• Immigration has also helped to ameliorate the consequences of Russia’s 
demographic decline. Russia could face serious labor shortages in all fields due to 
out-migration of skilled workers, high death rates among working age people, low 
birth rates, and a high percentage o f the population above retirement age. However, 
immigrants have compensated for three-fourths o f Russia’s natural population 
decrease between 1992 and 2003. The majority of immigrants are of working age, 
and although many are employed in low-skill sectors of the economy, migrants 
from the CIS also include a large number o f university graduates (Trouth).
Notwithstanding the number o f immigrants moving into Russia, the net increase 
in population continues to be negative. As table 13 shows, immigration is providing 
little relief. At a peak of 809,000 in 1994, immigration fell to 72,000 in 2001. In the 
same year the natural “increase” was an astonishing negative 943,000. The 2004 
estimates by the CIA in Table 12 indicate that the trend continues.
Table 12
Population
growth -0.45% (2004 est.)
rate:
Birth rate:
9.63 births/1,000 population (2004 est.)
Death
rate: 15.17 deaths/1,000 population (2004 est.)
Net
migration 1.02 migrant(s)/1.000 population (2004 est.)
rate:
Source.CIA
Table 13
u  Nat Inc. 
a  Net miq
-t
Year
R ussia ; Net Migration and  Natural Increase, 
1960-2001
Source: Migration Information Source
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Anatoly Vishnevsky, in a report to the Expert Group Meeting on Policy 
Responses to Population Ageing and Population Decline, Population Division, 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat concluded:
In Russia, like in most industrial countries, the balance of births and deaths 
will most likely be such in the first half of the 21st century that the natural 
population increase will be negative. If  the country’s population will continue 
to depend largely on the natural reproduction, it will unavoidably decrease in 
size and will age rapidly. These two trends might be counteracted only by an 
inflow of immigrants, to a larger or smaller extent, depending on the volume 
and composition of immigration flows
Their inevitability is dictated by the internal demographic situation in 
Russia”, he continued. “While unfavorable consequences of the population 
aging are not so dramatic as sometimes imagined, and those actually present 
may be largely neutralized by economic and social policy measures, the 
population decrease will present Russia with a very hard choice. It should 
either succumb to a continuous aggravation of the already meager population 
/ territory ratio, or to widely open its doors to immigration. Both solutions 
bear unwelcome consequences, so the lesser of two evils should be chosen 
(Vishnevsky).
The immigration policy for Russia appears to be one of including only 
Russian speaking peoples from the FSU. However, as we can see from the 
information provided this source is drying up. Lost in the discussion is the paranoia 
that Russia has had historically in regards to its borders and the inflow of non- 
Russian speaking people. One can look as recently to the border policies during the
flicold war or more notably, the Mongol invasion of the 13 century. Since then
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Russia has been suspicious of all foreigners within its borders and has seen 
everyone as a threat. A position such as this, ingrained for centuries, will be 
difficult to lose. But lose it they must, if  they wish to see population numbers in the 
black ever again.
The goal o f replacing Russia’s population with natural increase of course 
remains a long term goal. The current challenges are what to do in the short term. 
Massively increased immigration is the logical short term solution. Expanding its 
borders is the only other solution, and not a good one in today’s environment. With 
democratic changes happening within its sphere of influence, this will be a more 
unlikely scenario. Recently Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan have taken a path 
that indicates they would like to distance themselves with Russia and align more to 
the West. The current regime has overplayed its hand, most notably in the Ukraine 
election where Putin strongly supported the losing candidate. Putin may have been 
counting on Ukraine to rejoin Russia at some point and create a powerful block. 
Ukraine, with its new president Yushenko, is intent on staying a sovereign state. 
The chance o f integrating Ukraine’s 50 million people into Russia’s population is 
gone. With Russia predicted to lose up to one million people per year for the 
foreseeable future, the time to act is now. Russia must open up its borders to 
massive immigration.
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Chapter IV
Conclusion
In chapter one I asked, “What are the causes o f Russia’s population decline?” 
Starting with World War II and the purges of the 1930s I argued that the population 
decline we see today has its roots in these events. A total loss o f 30-40 million 
people during this time, many in their prime reproductive years, had a catastrophic 
effect. In addition to losing millions o f able bodied men, Russia also lost hundreds 
of thousands of intellectuals. This loss certainly had a negative effect on scientific 
endeavors and advancement in technology.
Furthermore, I have shown that controlling disease is one of the main 
challenges that Russia has today. The statistic that Russia consumes 4 billion 
bottles o f vodka alone, or 40 bottles per Russian, is a startling fact. It is estimated 
that one out o f every seven people is an alcoholic. Research has shown that alcohol 
plays a major role in accidental death, not to mention deaths from alcohol 
poisoning. Many Russians drink to excess, and this leads to other health problems 
such as heart failure and birth defects. The Russian government surely shares the 
blame for this, as it is addicted to the revenue accumulated from alcohol sales 
(CSM). Hundreds o f millions of dollars in state revenue comes from vodka sales 
alone. At the same time the health ministry is trying to combat alcoholism.
But alcoholism is not the only disease threat Russia faces. Tuberculosis is a 
rampaging epidemic. Just a couple o f decades ago 7.7 o f every 100 new TB victims 
died as a result o f the disease. That figure now hovers around 25.5 per 100. With
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188,000 new cases o f TB reported each year, the problem is not getting any better. 
A senior health ministry official has estimated that 30,000 of those new cases will 
face death. Compounding the problem is the spread of HIV/AIDS. With this 
disease the immune system is depressed making it much easier for a person with 
HIV/AIDS to contract TB. Therefore many HIV/AIDS patients also contract TB 
further enhancing the chances of death.
Research has determined that one percent of the population is infected with 
HIV/AIDS and in 2003 there were 253,000 new registrations. One o f the main 
challenges, the experts say, is that of information and awareness. Russians, 
especially the young, simply are not aware of the risks and have not been informed 
by the government. Additionally I showed that Russia is responsible for 75% of 
total cases in the region, or the “near abroad.”
The fertility rate in Russia is yet another opportunity to return to natural 
replacement. Whereas in 1987 the births per woman were 2.19, by 1999 it had been 
cut almost by half. This is well below the level of natural replacement level o f 2.1. 
It is shown that 13% of Russia’s married couple of childbearing age are infertile, 
twice the number in the United States. Female infertility comes from two highly 
unusual risks. First, Russian women have come to rely on abortion as the primary 
means of contraception, usually in conditions paralleling those of the old Soviet 
health system. Second, all indications are that the average Russian woman can 
expect to have more abortions in her lifetime than live births.
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I finally argued in chapter one that the Russian health system is in a state of 
disrepair. I noted a physician that makes the equivalent of $130 per month and runs 
a maternity ward that sits next door to a Tuberculosis clinic. The health care that 
was state provided during Soviet times is still state funded, although benefits have 
been cut by a third. Because of this, many Russians simply cannot afford a degree 
of health care that comes anywhere close to the standard in the West. As a result, 
the life expectancy o f Russian men and women has dropped considerably since 
1991.
In chapter two I asked, “What are the effects o f Russia’s population decline?” I 
argued that there are two main effects. First is the number of people who are 
economically productive, or able to work and contribute to the economic well being 
of the country. A stark reality is that the number of people over the age o f 60 has 
doubled in the last couple of decades. I presented data that very few people in 
Russia over the age of 60 are economically active. Furthermore, studies have 
shown that the ratio o f retired to working people will increase by 50% by the year 
2020. Dramatic steps forward in technology would have to be accomplished to 
counter the loss o f productive workers.
The second major effect, I argued, is that of national security and the state of 
Russia’s armed forces. The lack o f able bodied men has presented a problem just to 
provide the number of forces needed in Chechnya, let alone to have the standing 
army needed to protect a country that spans eleven time zones. The military has 
therefore lowered the standards for recruits. According to some reports 50% of
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draftees have “limited suitability” on health grounds. Furthermore, 25% of draftees 
have only eight years o f education and many others have drug and criminal 
histories.
In addition to the woes of the army, the government will be pressured greatly 
to be able to take care o f the ageing population. Financing the pension and social 
security systems appears to be an impossible task.
In chapter three I asked, “What is the solution to Russia’s population decline?” 
I argued that increased immigration is the only logical short term solution to the 
decline in population. Increasing births and decreasing deaths, I showed, can only 
be seen as a long term solution, but must be made a priority along with 
immigration. It is not just the quantity o f people that Russia is losing due to death 
that is problematic. The quality o f people it is losing to emigration is also a 
concern. Intellectuals have experienced a loss o f prestige in Russia and are leaving 
for greener pastures in the West. This trend must be reversed and incentives created 
to stop the “brain drain.”
Furthermore, Russia is seeing some immigration from FSU states, most 
notably Central Asian Russian speaking individuals. But these immigrants are 
typically those of little education who are filling the jobs ordinary Russians do not 
desire. I likened this to the majority of Mexican immigrants coming to the United 
States to take the jobs not desired by Americans. Still, the number of immigrants is 
not enough to offset the decrease caused by those factors covered in chapter two. 
Worse yet, is that those coming in do not possess the same skills, needed to
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contribute to the economy, as those that are leaving. Immigration numbers are 
falling each year as the number o f people in FSU states that want to “return home” 
dwindles.
The history of the Russian people is one that can only be admired. Russians, 
throughout their history, have shown a remarkable resiliency and have overcome 
obstacles that are hard to fathom in the West. Rich in culture and tradition, long 
oppressed and finally free, they find themselves saddled with the most difficult 
challenge yet, the steep decline in population. The government must institutionalize 
massive immigration reform or be prepared to spiral down to the status of a third 
world country.
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